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1HLD-066   (January 2010)  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3152
___________
WARREN F. ARSAD, JR.,
Appellant
vs.
JUDGE RAYFORD MEANS, PHILADELPHIA COURT COMMON PLEAS;
ADA CAROL SWEENEY, ESQ., DISTRICT ATTORNEY OFFICE;
JOHN W. GOLDSBOROUGH, ESQ.;
ROBIN GODFREY, ESQ., DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 09-cv-02980)
District Judge:  Honorable Robert F. Kelly
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 29, 2010
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed: February 16, 2010
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Warren Arsad, appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his
2pro se complaint.  Upon consideration of the record, we conclude that the District Court
properly determined that the Arsad’s claims were legally frivolous.  Therefore, because
the appeal presents no arguable issues of fact or law, we will dismiss it pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §  1915(e)(2)(B).
Arsad, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at SCI-Cresson, filed a civil
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Honorable Rayford A. Means of
the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, and three attorneys from the Philadelphia
District Attorney’s Office.  In his complaint, Arsad challenges, inter alia, Judge Means’
jurisdiction and sentencing determinations with respect to a state criminal action, and
accuses the Assistant District Attorneys of prosecutorial and professional misconduct
with respect to that same criminal action.  Arsad sought various monetary damages for
what he alleges were violations of his “civil and human” rights.  In an order entered on
July 15, 2009, the District Court dismissed Arsad’s complaint as legally frivolous under
the in forma pauperis statute.  This timely appeal followed.
We will dismiss the appeal as lacking legal merit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B), as Arsad’s complaint was properly disposed of by the District Court. 
Initially we note that, insofar as appellant seeks money damages as a result of his
conviction or sentence, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars the action because
Arsad has not alleged that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated.  In Heck, the
Supreme Court held that a state prisoner could not maintain an action for damages under
3the civil rights laws if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”  Id. at 487.
To the extent that Arsad seeks monetary damages for an alleged
constitutional violation in connection with his criminal proceedings that would not imply
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, the District Court correctly concluded that
appellant’s claims were meritless.  Any challenge Arsad sought to assert with respect to
the actions of a state court judge was properly disposed of with little discussion as judges
are entitled to absolute immunity in § 1983 actions seeking monetary damages for acts
performed in their judicial capacities.  See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). 
Likewise, the District Court committed no error in rejecting Arsad’s claims against the
state prosecuting attorneys as it is a well established principle that a prosecuting attorney
acting within the scope of his duties is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit for
damages.  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
Accordingly, the appeal lacks merit and we will dismiss it pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).  Arsad’s motions to
“aggregate” and “consolidate” several of his many appeals are denied without discussion. 
We briefly note that some of the appeals Arsad seeks to have consolidated have already
been closed. 
